Freedom of Choice in the South: A Constitutional Perspective by Brown, Richard W.
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 28 | Number 3
The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the
1966-1967 Term: A Symposium
April 1968
Freedom of Choice in the South: A Constitutional
Perspective
Richard W. Brown
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
Richard W. Brown, Freedom of Choice in the South: A Constitutional Perspective, 28 La. L. Rev. (1968)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol28/iss3/21
COMMENTS
FREEDOM OF CHOICE IN THE SOUTH:
A CONSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE
One of the most hotly debated constitutional issues of our
time concerns the school desegregation process in the southern
states.' This Comment examines the constitutionality of the
freedom of choice plan for pupil assignment used by southern
school boards as a part of the desegregation process, emphasiz-
ing the role of freedom of choice in the Fifth Circuit and the
effect of the United States v. Jefferson County Board of Educa-
tion decisions.2
The states' actions in classifying students by race to facili-
tate the establishment of a segregated school system was held
to violate the "equal protection clause" of the fourteenth amend-
ment in Brown v. Board of Education.3 The Supreme Court dis-
posed of the "separate but equal" formula which had been an-
nounced in Plessy v. Ferguson4 by holding:
"[I]n the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate
but equal' has no place. Separate educational facilities are
inherently unequal. Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs
and others similarly situated for whom the actions have been
brought are, by reason of the segregation complained of,
deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by
the Fourteenth Amendment."5
The second Brown v. Board of Education6 ordered desegregation
to proceed "on a racially nondiscriminatory basis with all de-
liberate speed. ' 7
Two distinct interpretations have evolved from the language
1. The southern states include Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Lou-
isiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and
Virginia. U.S. COMMISSION ON CIvIL RIGHTS, SOUTHERN SCHOOL DESGREGATION
1966-67 (1967).
2. The case was first heard before a three-judge panel, 372 F.2d 836
(5th Cir. 1966). It was later considered by the court en banc on petition for
rehearing, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1967). The panel decision will hereafter be
referred to as Jefferson I, while the rehearing will be referred to as Jef-
ferson II. When speaking of the two decisions in conjunction, the writer
will use the term Jefferson.
3. 347 U.S. 483 (1954), hereafter referred to as Brown I.
4. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
5. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
6. 349 U.S. 294 (1955), hereafter referred to as Brown II. The courts
were given the power to "consider the adequacy of any plan the defendants
may propose to meet these problems and to effectuate a transition to a
racially nondiscriminatory school system." Id. at 301.
7. Id.
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of the Brown decisions.8 One view holds Brown I and II to mean
that separate schools for Negroes and whites are inherently
unequal. Therefore, the equal protection clause requires the
state to take affirmative action to remedy the inequality by mix-
ing the racesY The other view finds a violation only where the
state has acted to segregate the schools.' 0 This view would apply
the equal protection clause in a negative sense, so that a state
is precluded from requiring segregation, but not forced to act
affirmatively to achieve a certain degree of integration in the
schools." The latter view has been adopted by a majority of the
courts. The dispute continues, and must ultimately be decided
by the United States Supreme Court.'2 The law applied in the
Southern federal circuits, however, invites examination.
The Freedom of Choice Plan
The freedom of choice plan has become the dominant de-
segregation approach in the South.'8 This remedy purports to
& For a good discussion of the two opposing trends of thought, see
Note, 18 VAND. L. REV. 1290 (1965).9. Concerning the affirmative action theory, see Barksdale v. Springfield
School Committee, 237 F. Supp. 543 (D. Mass. 1965); Taylor v. Board of
Education, 191 F. Supp. 181 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Cox, Foreword: Constitutional
Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91
(1966); Fiss, Racial Imbalance in the Public Schools: The Constitutional
Concepts, 78 -ARv. L. REV. 564 (1964).
10. The pioneering court decision expressing the view states: "The
Constitution . . . does not require integration. It merely forbids discrimina-
tion." Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F. Supp. 776, 777 (E.D.S.C. 1955). Other decisions
following the Briggs doctrine include Downs v. Board of Education of
Kansas City, 336 F.2d 988 (10th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 914 (1964):
Bell v. School City of Gary, Indiana, 213 F. Supp. 819 (N.D. Ind.), aft'd, 324
F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 924 (1964); Evans v. Buchanan,
207 F. Supp. 820 (D. Del. 1962). For a good article discussing the view, see
Kaplan, Segregation, Litigation and the Schools-Part II: The General
Northern Problem, 58 Nw. U.L. REV. 157 (1963).
11. Note, 18 VAND. L. REV. 1290, 1337 (1965): "The majority view, repre-
sented by decisions of two Circuit Courts of Appeal-the seventh in Bell
and the tenth in Downs--finds no requirement in Brown that educational
authorities must act to alleviate racial imbalance. The courts which fol-
lowed this view have adhered to a technical interpretation of Brown which
emphasizes the importance of racial classification. Proponents of the view
also point to the fact that there is no definite sociological proof of a causal
relationship between fortuitous racial imbalance and academic deprecation
or psychological harm to the Negro child.
"Finding that school authorities must act to ease racial imbalance, a
few courts have held that racially imbalanced schools deprive the Negro
child of equal educational opportunity."
12. Two Important cases will be decided by the United States Supreme
Court in the 1967-68 term, which should cast some light on the situation.
Raney v. Board of Education of Gould School District, 381 F.2d 252 (8th
Cir. 1967), cert. granted, 88 S.Ct. 783 (1968) (No. 805); Monroe v. Board of
Commissioners, City of Jackson, Tennessee, 380 F.2d 955 (6th Cir. 1967),
cert. granted, 88 S.Ct. 771 (1968) (No. 740).
13. U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, SOUTHERN SCHOOL DESEGREGATION
1966-67, 45-46 (1967): "Free choice plans are favored overwhelmingly by
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give each pupil the unrestricted right to attend any school in the
district. The only reason a student may be refused admission
to a school is overcrowding or some other extraordinary cir-
cumstance.14
The plan has been used in various forms in the South.
Some school boards have used it to perpetuate segregation, but
the courts have scrutinized all suspicious plans to insure that
each student has a truly free choice.15 The Civil Rights Act of
196416 gave the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
the right to withhold federal assistance from any local school
district which fails to meet minimum requirements determined
by the Department for the school desegregation process.17 To
provide some objective standards, the Department has issued
Guidelines-prerequisites for the receipt of federal aid-setting
forth requirements for the freedom of choice plans.'8 These
Guidelines 9 have been given considerable weight2 by the Fifth
the 1,787 school districts desegregating under voluntary plans. All such
districts in Alabama, Mississippi, and South Carolina, without exception
and 83 percent of such districts in Georgia have adopted free choice plans.
.. . The great majority of districts desegregating under court order also
are employing freedom of choice. Of the 160 school desegregation suits which
had been brought within the Fifth Circuit prior to March 6, 1967, some 129
had resulted in orders embodying free choice plans; only 11 districts under
court order in the Fifth Circuit used geographical zoning in whole or In'
part."
14. The circuits ruling on free choice plans have all held that over-
crowding is the only legitimate reason for rejecting a student's choice.
Racial considerations will not be tolerated. The Guidelines of the Depart-
ment of Health, Education, and Welfare include "overcrowding and other
reasons stemming from extraordinary circumstances" as the only excuses
for rejection of an application. Revised Statement of Policies for School
Desegregation Plans under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 45 C.F.R.
§ 181 (1966).
15. See, e.g., Goss v. Board of Education, 373 U.S. 683 (1963) (declared
unconstitutional a minority to majority transfer plan that was limited to
white students); Kemp v. Beasly, 352 F.2d 14 (8th Cir. 1965) (the provision
of an annual choice was held required to validate a free choice plan);
Lockett v. Board of Education of Muscogee County, 342 F.2d 225 (5th Cir.
1965) (a freedom of choice plan is unconstitutional where it is established
on a pre-existing system which was the result of racial discrimination by
the school board).
16. Text of the Act of 1964-Civil Rights Act of 1964, 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d)
(1964); 79 Stat. 445 (1965), 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (1965); 78 Stat. 249-52 (1964), 42
U.S.C. § 1975(a)-(d) (1964); 78 Stat. 243-68 (1964), 42 U.S.C. § 2000(c)-(h)
(1964).
17. 78 Stat. 252 (1964), 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1964).
18. Revised Statement of Policies for School Desegregation Plans Under
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 45 C.F.R. § 181 (1966).
19. For a good discussion of the HEW Guidelines and their effect on
freedom of choice plans, see Dunn, Title VI, The Guidelines and School
Desegregation in the South, 53 VA. L. REv. 42 (1967).
20. The HEW Guidelines were given such "great weight" by the Fifth
Circuit because the Department of Education had acquired such expertise in
the area that the court felt its findings to be exceptionally reliable. The
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Circuit in determining the constitutionality of the plans.2 1 The
Fifth Circuit has been quick to point out, however, that the
court's power stems not from the Civil Rights Act of 1964 but
from the equal protection clause itself.22 The details of the
Department's free choice Guidelines are aimed at securing actual
existence of free choice.28
The freedom of choice plan, an institution unique to the
South, has certain advantages over plans adopted in other areas
of the country. Prior to Brown the North and West had adopted
the neighborhood school plan; and although its use has not
been precluded by Brown, much controversy has arisen con-
cerning the drawing of geographical zones necessary to the plan.
A dispute has developed whether the state has a duty to elimi-
nate de facto segregation 24-that which occurs not by force of
law but by fortuitous residential segregation. Geographical
zoning was also common in the South, but was based on a dual
zoning system, one zone for Negroes and one for whites. A
freedom of choice plan in which the choice is more than nomi-
nally free would seem largely to overcome the effects of resi-
dential racial groupings. Racial separation under free choice
can only result from the individual's school selection. The state
will not force him to attend the school nearest his home, and
Guidelines -were declared constitutional, also. Other circuits, although not
giving such full endorsement to the Guidelines as the Fifth Circuit, have
accorded them much respect. For a good general discussion of the Guidelines
and their effect and impact in southern school desegregation, see Comment,
77 YALE L.J. 321 (1967).
21. United States v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 380 F.2d 385,
390 (5th Cir. 1967): "In constructing the original and revised decrees, the
court gave great weight to the 1965 and 1966 HEW Guidelines. These Guide-
lines establish minimum standards clearly applicable to disestablishing state-
sanctioned segregation."
22. United States v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 372 F.2d 836,
880-81: "Second, the equitable powers of the courts exist independently of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. It is not contended in the instant cases that
the Act conferred new authority on the courts. And this Court has not
looked to the Act as a grant of new judicial authority."
23. Hearings on H.R. 26 Before the Committee on Rules, 89th Cong.,
2d Sess. 32-34 (1966). Speaking of the purpose of the Guidelines, the present
Commissioner of Education said: "We are trying to give the effect of free
choices in having pupils enter into whatever school they may wish to
attend."
24. Moses v. Washington Parish School Board, 276 F. Supp. 834, 840
(E.D. La. 1967): "Lest there be confusion from the beginning, it should be
understood that as used conventionally now by most legal writers and
courts, the term 'de jure segregation' means simply 'segregation' in the tra-
ditional sense; whereas 'de facto segregation' cannot be said to mean segre-
gation in the traditional sense at all, but rather the mere chance of fortui-
tous concentration of those of a particular race in a particular class or
school-fortuitous 'separation' of the races, not accomplished in any way
by the actions of state officials."
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under a properly administered plan, there is no state involve-
ment in the pupil's selection. The disadvantage of the free choice
plan lies in its administrative difficulty.2
The Jefferson Decision's Effect
Perhaps from a feeling of frustration, and to give effect to
federal policy, 26 the Fifth Circuit in Jefferson dramatically dis-
carded" the Briggs v. Elliott doctrine, which had held that
Brown I and II did not impose an affirmative duty to integrate
but merely prohibited state enforced segregation in public
schools.28
The majority in Jefferson I adopted the affirmative action
theory, at least as far as its applicability to formerly de jure
segregated schools is concerned.29 The court held that "the only
25. For a case holding that the school board could not institute a free-dom of choice plan because it did not accomplish good school administra-
tion, see Moses v. Washington Parish School Board, 276 F. Supp. 834 (E.D.
La. 1967).
26. Pressure has emanated from recent United States Supreme Court
holdings and federal legislation aimed at accelerating the desegregation
process in the South. Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward Coun-
ty, 377 U.S. 218, 229 (1964) ("There has been entirely too much deliberation and
not enough speed in enforcing the constitutional rights which we held in
Brown v. Board of Education, 8upra, had been denied Prince Edward County
Negro children."); Bradley v. School Board of Richmond, 382 U.S. 103, 105
(1965) ("Delays in desegregating school systems are no longer tolerable.").
Concerning the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Fifth Circuit in United
States v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 372 F.2d 836, 849-50 (5th Cir.
1966) said: "Ten years after Brown, came the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Con-
gress decided that the time had come for a sweeping civil rights advance,
including national legislation to speed up desegregation of public schools
and to put teeth into enforcement of desegregation."
27. In rejecting Briggs v. Elliott and adopting the affirmative duty theory,
the court overruled several prior decisions by that same court. There were
nine decisions in all, commencing with Avery v. Wichita Falls Independent
School District, 241 F.2d 230 (5th Cir. 1957), and ending with Lockett v. Board
of Education of Muscogee County School District, Georgia, 342 F.2d 225 (5th
Cir. 1965).
28. Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F. Supp. 776 (E.D.S.C. 1955).
29. The court seemed hesitant to go so far as to adopt the affirmative
action theory to its full extent to include the do facto segregation in the
North. It draws a distinction: "The similarity of pseudo de facto segrega-
tion in the South to actual de facto segregation in the North is more ap-
parent than real .... In this circuit, therefore, the location of Negro schools
with Negro faculties in Negro neighborhoods and white schools in white
neighborhoods cannot be described as an unfortunate fortuity. It came into
existence as state action and continues to exist as racial gerrymandering,
made possible by the dual system. United States v. Jefferson County Board
of Education, 372 F.2d 836, 876 (5th Cir. 1966). This distinction was criticized
as being fictitious by Judges Gerwin and Bell in their dissent in Jefferson II:
"This distinction, which must be without a difference and somewhat hollow
to a deprived child wherever located, is used as a beginning. . . . The dejure-de facto doctrine simply is without basis. Segregation by law was legal
until the Brown decision in 1954. Such segregation should hardly give rise
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school desegregation plan that meets constitutional standards is
the one that works."30 The court clarified its statement by
revealing a newly adopted objective:
"As we see it, the law imposes an absolute duty to
desegregate, that is, disestablish segregation. And an absolute
duty to integrate, in the sense that a disproportionate con-
centration of Negroes in certain schools cannot be ignored;
rather, mixing of students is a high priority educational
goal. The law does not require a maximum of racial mix-
ing or striking a racial balance accurately reflecting the
racial composition of the community or the school popula-
tion ...
"The criteria for determining the validity of a desegre-
gation plan is whether it is reasonably related to the objec-
tive."3
This conclusion is justified by the rationale underlying the
affirmative action theory that segregated schools are by their
very nature unequal, and that school authorities have a duty
to provide an equal educational opportunity for all children. 2
To remedy this existing inequality, school officials have the
affirmative duty to mix the races.33 In Jefferson II,34 the court
adopted the panel decision of Jefferson 1:81
"The court holds that boards and officials administering
public schools in this circuit have the affirmative duty under
the Fourteenth Amendment to bring about an integrated,
unitary school system in which there are no Negro schools
and no white schools-just schools."8 6
to punitive treatment of those states employing what was then a legal sys-
tem. United States v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 380 F.2d 385,
413-14 (5th Cir. 1967); see also Davis v. East Baton Rouge Parish School
Board, 269 F. Supp. 60 (E.D. La. 1967).
30. United States v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 372 F.2d 836,
847 (5th Cir. 1966).
31. Id. at 846-47 n.5.
32. See Note, 18 VAND L. REv. 1290, 1301-06 (1965).
33. United States v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 372 F.2d 836,
869 (5th Cir. 1966): "In a school system the persons capable of giving class
relief are of course its administrators. It is they who are under the affirma-
tive duty to take corrective action toward the goal of one Integrated system."
34. United States v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 380 F.2d 385
(5th Cir. 1967).
35. Id. at 389: "The court sitting en banc adopts the opinion and decree
filed in these cases December 29, 1966, subject to the clarifying statements
In this opinion and the changes in the decree attached to this opinion."
36. Id.
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The effect Jefferson will have on the status of free choice in
the Fifth Circuit is considerable. Following the reasoning of the
court to its logical conclusion, grave doubts" surround the
validity of a free choice plan that does not produce a racially
balanced school system:
"Freedom of choice is not a goal in itself. It is a means to an
end. A schoolchild has no inalienable right to choose his
school. A freedom of choice plan is but one of the tools
available to school officials at this stage of the process of
converting the dual system of separate schools for Negroes
and whites into a unitary system."3
The Fifth Circuit held that the percentages 9 set forth in the
HEW Guidelines are a reliable reference in deciding whether a
plan is working.40 If a plan does not work, it should be dis-
continued.41
The freedom of choice system was designed to place the
burden of school assignment on the pupil himself. He has the
choice to attend a formerly all white or formerly all Negro
school. The Fifth Circuit would shift this burden to the school
officials who must undo the wrong which has been done by
devising a plan which results in some, as yet undetermined,
degree of racial mixing. Apparently, all freedom of choice plans
37. In United States v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 372 F.2d
836, 888-89 (5th Cir. 1966), the court recognized that freedom of choice plans
have "serious shortcomings." The Commission on Civil Rights also criticized
the free choice plan, stating: "Freedom of choice plans . . . had failed to
disestablish the dual school system in Southern and border States, the
Commission determined. This failure was attributable to the fact that such
plans did not eliminate the racial identity of the schools and placed the
burden of change upon Negro parents and pupils who often were reluctant
to assert their rights for fear of harassment and intimidation by hostile
white persons. U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIOHTS, SOUTHERN SCHOOL DESEGRE-
GATION 1966-67 pt. 2, at 3 (1967).
38. United States v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 380 F.2d 385,
390 (5th Cir. 1967).
39. Id.: "The percentages referred to In the Guidelines and In this
Court's decree are simply a rough rule of thumb for measuring the effective-
ness of freedom of choice as a useful tool."
40. The percentages of students who transfer from segregated schools,
if not measuring up to expectations, may result in the commissioner holding
that the plan does not meet "constitutional and statutory requirements."
This may require revision of the plan or adoption of a different plan alto-
gether in order to meet HEW standards for federal financial aid. Revised
Statement of Policies for School Desegregation Plans Under Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 45 C.F.R. § 181.54 (1967).
41. Id.: "If the plan is ineffective, longer on promises than performance,
the school officials charged with Initiating and administering a unitary
system have not met the constitutional requirements of the Fourteenth
Amendment; they should try other tools."
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which do not effect an actual racial mixing retain little validity
in the Fifth Circuit.4 That a plan is modelled after the HEW
Guidelines and is fairly administered seemingly is not deter-
minative of its efficacy in achieving integration.
The Other Circuits
The Eighth Circuit disagrees with the Fifth Circuit's con-
clusions. In Clark v. Board of Education of Little Rock School
Dist.,43 decided shortly before Jefferson I, the court upheld the
constitutionality of a free choice plan, stating:
"If all of the students are, in fact, given a free and
uninhibited choice of school, which is honored by the school
board, it cannot be said that the state is segregating the
races, operating a school with dual attendance areas or
considering race in the assignment of students to their
classrooms. We find no unlawful discrimination in the giv-
ing of students a free choice of schools. The system is not
subject to constitutional objections simply because large
segments of whites and Negroes choose to continue attend-
ing their familiar schools. '44
"In short," the court declared, "the Constitution does not require
a school system to force a mixing of the races in schools accord-
ing to some predetermined mathematical formula. '46 It warned,
however, that a pupil's constitutional rights may be violated
if he is unable to exercise a free choice due to state action
correlative to the free choice plan.4 6 On rehearing,47 after
Jefferson I, the Eighth Circuit reaffirmed its holding in Clark
stating, "We find no state act that results in discrimination
against Negroes."48 In Kelley v. Altheimer,49 the court intimated
42. Subsequent to the Jefferson decisions, one district court In the Fifth
Circuit failed to find a freedom of choice plan unconstitutional because it
did not accomplish a racial mixing but required its abandonment on other
grounds. The court said: "As we have indicated, we by no means base our
decision on the theory that 'free-choice' has not 'worked' to integrate the
school system and that a different method must therefore be tried." Moses v.
Washington Parish School Board, 276 F. Supp. 834, 847 (E.D. La. 1967).
43. 369 F.2d 661 (8th Cir. 1966).
44. Id. at 666.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 667: "If the program is designed to, or in fact does, intimidate
or Influence the students in their choice of schools, so that Negro children
are induced to attend Negro schools, this would be unconstitutional state
action in violation of the rights to equal protection and due process of law."
47. Clark v. Board of Education of Little Rock School District, 374
F.2d 569 (8th Cir. 1967).
48. Id. at 571.
49. 378 F.2d 483 (8th Cir. 1967).
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that freedom of choice plans would be held to higher standards 0
to establish their constitutionality, but again rejected a proposal
to eliminate freedom of choice and require active integration
of classes.51 In Raney v. Board of Education,52 the Eighth Cir-
cuit followed Clark but warned that good faith administration5 3
of the plan is required. The distinction to be noted between the
Eighth Circuit view and that of the Fifth is that when the
former requires a freedom of choice plan to "work" in order to
be constitutional, it means it must be operated in good faith
by school authorities to insure that each student has no inter-
ference in making his choice from sources attributable to the
state; when the Fifth Circuit requires the plan to "work," how-
ever, it means not only good faith administration but also active
racial mixing of the pupils in fact.
The Sixth Circuit contains school districts desegregated
both prior and subsequent to Brown. In Deal v. Cincinnati Board
of Education,4 the Circuit rejected the contention that the four-
teenth amendment demands integration of schools despite the
presence of a school assignment system administered in good
faith and not based on race. Although Deal involved a school
district desegregated prior to Brown, the court later reached
the same result with respect to a school system desegre-
gated after Brown.5 5 The Sixth Circuit, therefore, is in accord
with the Eighth Circuit in opposing Jefferson by holding that
equal protection does not require affirmative state action to
50. The higher standards imposed were chiefly in the fields of trans-
portation and faculty desegregation. The court holds that a choice is not
actually free until transportation sufficient to effectuate that choice is pro-
vided by school officials to the maximum extent feasible. Also freedom of
choice is not insured until the faculties are desegregated.
51. 378 F.2d 483, 498 (8th Cir. 1967): "They ask that we require that the
Board of Education to take action immediately to integrate all of the ele-
mentary classes at one time and secondary classes at the other. Though
this solution has great appeal because of Its simplicity, and obvious efficien-
cy, we are not prepared to hold at this time, in view of our recent de-
cisions . . . that desegregation in accordance with the Constitution cannot
be accomplished if students are permitted to attend schools of their choice."
52. 381 F.2d 252 (8th Cir. 1967).
53. Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 299 (1955). The Court
alluded to the following language in Brown: "School authorities have the
primary responsibility for elucidating, assessing, and solving these prob-
lems; courts will have to consider whether the action of school authorities
constitutes good faith implementation of the governing constitutional prin-
ciples."
54. 369 F.2d 55 (6th Cir. 1966).
55. In Monroe v. Board of Commissioners, City of Jackson, Tenn., 380
F.2d 955 (6th Cir. 1967), the court refused to recognize the distinction which
Jefferson I made between the states desegregating before Brown and those
desegregating afterwards and applied the holding in Deal to that case also.
1968]
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effect racially balanced schools.56 The Constitution requires only
that there be a plan fairly administered which removes all state
interference from a pupil's free choice.
The Fourth Circuit, in the process of desegregating schools,
has faced problems similar to those of the Fifth Circuit, and
has given particular attention to the dictates of Jefferson I.
The status of free choice in the Fourth Circuit is in need of
further clarification; at present it does not include an affirma-
tive duty of the school authorities to accomplish racial mixing.
In Bowman v. County School Board,5 7 the court states that the
type of freedom of choice plan approved by the Fifth Circuit in
the Jefferson decisions imposes "standards no more exacting than
those we have imposed and sanctioned," ' s but the court seemed
unwilling to follow Jefferson in requiring an ultimate objective
of racial mixing. The court used the following language:
"If each pupil, each year, attends the school of his choice,
the Constitution does not require that he be deprived of his
choice unless its exercise is not free. Thus we have held and
we adhere to our holdings ...
".... Since the plaintiffs here concede that their annual
choice is unrestricted and unencumbered, we find in its
existence no denial of any constitutional right not to be
subjected to racial discrimination."59
While confirming the status of free choice as a permissible school
desegregation plan, the court admonished that, "if there are
extraneous pressures which deprive the choice of its freedom,
the school board may be required to adopt affirmative measures
to counter them."0 0 The concurring opinion in Bowman criticizes
the opinion of the court for not imposing standards on free
choice plans as strict as those employed in Jefferson I and urges
56. Id. at 958: "We are asked to follow United States v. Jefferson County
Board of Education . . . which seems to hold that the pre-Brown biracial
states must obey a different rule than those which desegregated earlier or
never did segregate .... However ugly and evil the biracial schools systems
appear in contemporary thinking, they were, as Jefferson, supra, conceded,
de jure and were once found lawful .... [T]o apply a disparate rule be-
cause these early systems are now forbidden by Brown would be In the
nature of imposing a judicial Bill of Attainder .... But to the extent that
United States v. Jefferson County Board of Education, and the decisions
reviewed therein, are factually analogous and express a rule of law contrary
to our view herein and in Deal, we respectfully decline to follow them,"
57. 382 F.2d 326 (4th Cir. 1967).
58. Id. at 328.
59. Id. at 327-28.
60. Id. at 328.
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acceptance of the Jefferson holdings in toto.6' The concurring
judges felt that freedom of choice is a device which has no
use unless it accomplishes racial mixing.6 2 Generally, the district
courts in the Circuit have rejected the affirmative action theory
and have followed the principles set forth in the majority opinion
in Bowman."
Free Choice and Traditional Equal Protection
With apparent conflict among the circuits concerning the
constitutional requirements of a free choice plan, the issue will
ultimately be decided in the United States Supreme Court.
In solving the problem, the constituent elements of an equal
protection violation must be reviewed, equal protection being
the constitutional basis for holding a segregated school system
based on race invalid.
The two basic elements involved in all equal protection
violations are state action and unreasonable classification. 4
Equal protection applies only against discriminatory state action
and not private discrimination. The United States Supreme Court
has recently reaffirmed the requirement of state action, "The
Equal Protection Clause speaks to the state or to those acting
under the color of its authority."6' 5 There exists a zone between
61. Sobelof and Winters concurring, id. at 331-32: "It may be profitable,
therefore to examine closely what the court of appeals of that jurisdiction
has recently said and done. We may then see how much further our courts
need to go to bring itself abreast of the Fifth Circuit."
62. Id. at 333. The concurring opinion contains the following language:
'Freedom of choice' is not a sacred talisman; it is only a means to a
constitutionally required end-the abolition of the system of segregation
and its effects. If the means prove effective, it is acceptable, but if it fail$
to undo segregation, other means must be used to achieve this end. The
school officials have the continuing duty to take whatever action may be
necessary to create a 'unitary, non-racial system.'"
63. In Betts v. County School Board of Halifax County, Va., 269 F. Supp.
593, 601 (W.D. Va. 1967), the district court stated: "I acknowledge the
persuasiveness of the guidelines insofar as they establish certain prerequi-
sites for a freedom of choice plan, but I reject the concept that the con-
stitutionality of such a plan must depend upon a certain degree of integra-
tion having been achieved. Implicit in the recent holding of the Fifth Circuit
in the Jefferson County case is a concept of the requirements of Brown v.
Board of Education which is contrary to the established law in this circuit
and which, consequently, I do not adopt." See also Wright v. County School
Board of Greensville County, Va., 252 F. Supp. 378 (E.D. Va. 1966); Swan v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 243 F. Supp. 667 (W.D.N.C.
1965). For a holding adopting the affirmative action theory, see Hobson v.
Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967).
64. See United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966); Evans v. Newton,
382 U.S. 296 (1966); United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 70 (1951); United
States v. Powell, 212 U.S. 564 (1909).
65. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 755 (1966).
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state and private action, however, where courts have some-
times found state action sufficient to constitute a violation. Thus,
state action may be indirect or it may be "only one of several
co-operative forces leading to a constitutional violation."66 A
free choice plan administered in good faith by school officials
would seem to remove any state action from the process of
pupil assignment.6 7 In such a situation the pupil or his parents
exercise an unhindered choice,68 and may choose any school
within the district. Can the concept of state action be extended
so far as to hold the state responsible for what an individual
freely chooses to do? Some manner of factual state interference
with the free choice itself would logically seem a prerequisite
for an equal protection clause violation.6 9 This view would
parallel that of the Eighth, Sixth, and probably the Fourth
Circuit. The Fifth Circuit's holding denies the existence of a
neutral area in which the state can remove itself completely
from the student's exercise of a free choice. Jefferson is hard to
reconcile with the traditional notion of "equal protection of
the laws.170
66. Id. at 755-56.
67. United States v., Jefferson County Board of Education, 380 F.2d 385,
404 (5th Cir. 1967). Judges Gewin and Bell dissenting in Jefferson II said:
"If the completely free choice is afforded and neither the students nor their
parents desire to change the schools the students have heretofore attended,
this court is without authority under the Constitution or any enactment of
Congress to compel them to make a change."
68. See, e.g., Raney v. Board of Education of Gould School District, 381
F.2d 252, 256 (8th Cir. 1967): "We recognized in Clark that a plan appro-
priate on its face could be unconstitutionally administered and observed
that in case of such a development, the District Court upon appropriate
application could do what is necessary to bring the plan up to constitutional
standards."
69. The Fifth, Eighth, Sixth, and Fourth Circuits hold that a freedom
of choice plan is unconstitutional when the student's choice is interfered
with by state officials or school authorities. See Bowman v. County School
Board, 382 F.2d 326 (4th Cir. 1967); Raney v. Board of Education of Gould
School District, 381 F.2d 252 (8th Cir. 1967); Monroe v. Board of Commis-
sioners, 380 F.2d 955 (6th Cir. 1967); United States v. Jefferson County Board
of Education, 372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1966). Where private pressures within
the community are alleged to have interfered with the free choice, a judicial
appraisal must be taken. If the pressures are found to be existent and acting
to deprive the pupil of his free choice, the school board may be ordered to
act to counter them. Bowman v. County School Board, 382 F.2d 326 (4th
Cir. 1967). Obstacles to the exercise of free choice have been listed in U.S.
COMMISSION ON CIvIL RIGHTS, REPORT ON SOUTHERN SCHOOL DESEGREGATION,
1966-67, 47-59 (1967). Perhaps the problem of private pressures can best be
handled by the courts of law through civil and criminal actions against the
coercers themselves. Such was suggested by id. at 97-98.
70. Concerning the Jefferson I holding and the affirmative action theory,
Justice Cox in his dissent in that decision states: "No court up to this time
has been heard to say that this Court now has the power and the authority
to force integration of both races upon these public schools without regard
1968] COMMENTS
Even if state action is found, it may be a valid exercise
of state power unless it results in an unreasonable classifica-
tion.7 1 Where is such unreasonable classification by the state
in a free choice plan? A pupil is not classified at all in the
sense of his being required to attend a certain school. Certainly,
no racial classification by the state can be demonstrated.
However, absent both state action and unreasonable classi-
fication, the Fifth Circuit in Jefferson requires the state to
take affirmative action to accomplish racial mixing.72 The equal
protection clause has not previously been interpreted as com-
pelling a state to take such action to accomplish any purpose,
however worthy.73
to any equitable considerations, or the will or wish of either race .... In
sum, there is no law to require one of these public schools to Integrate or
force mix these races in public schools." United States v. Jefferson County
Board of Education, 372 F.2d 836, 907, 909 (5th Cir. 1966).
71. In Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967), the United States Supreme
Court upheld the California Supreme Court's holding that a state constitu-
tional provision which prohibited the state from denying the right of any
person to decline to sell, lease, or rent his real property to such person as he
in his absolute discretion chooses, violates the equal protection clause be-
cause the state in so doing adopted private discrimination against Negroes.
The Court noted that real estate agents customarily attempt to place Negroes
in Negro neighborhoods and whites in white neighborhoods. The situation
involved in Reitman Is different from that of the state's institution of a free
choice plan. Whereas, in Reitman there was state adopted discriminatory
practices which the court held involved an unreasonable classification based
on race, there is no such unreasonable classification involved in a school
board's action to adopt a free choice plan for pupil assignment. Each pupil
has a free and unrestricted choice to attend the school he prefers. Where
each has the right to do as he wishes, there is no discrimination. In fact,
no classification exists at all.
72. The only action a state has been required to take under the equal
protection clause has been that of removing its own imposed unreasonable
classification.
73. Deal v. Cincinnati Board of Education, 369 F.2d 55, 59 (6th Cir. 1966):
"The principle thus established in our law is that the state may not erect
irrelevant barriers to restrict the full play of individual choice in any sector
of society. . . . If the state or any of its agencies has not adopted imper-
missible racial criteria in its treatment of individuals, then there is no vio-
lation of the Constitution. If factors outside the schools operate to deprive
some children of some of the existing choices, the school board is certainly
not responsible therefor. ... . Appellants, however, argue that the state must
take affirmative steps to balance the schools to counteract the variety of
private pressures that now operate to restrict the range of choices presented
to each school child. Such a theory of constitutional duty would destroy
the well settled principle that the Fourteenth Amendment governs only
state action. Under such a theory, all action would be state action, either
because the state itself had moved directly, or because some private person
had acted and thereby created the supposed duty of the state to counteract
any consequences."
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Conclusion
The equal protection clause has traditionally been applied
to remove any unreasonable classification a state may impose.7 4
It does not place upon the state the obligation actively to
remove all the judicially determined ills of society.
The Jefferson decisions of the Fifth Circuit conflict with
decisions of other circuits that have dealt with the freedom of
choice plan. It runs counter to traditional notions of equal
protection of the laws because of its requirement that school
boards act affirmatively. Any free choice plan offering an actual
choice untainted by state compulsion should be held constitu-
tional.7 5 Equal educational opportunity is a laudable goal 6 but
the means by which it is accomplished must be within the
Constitution."
Richard W. Brown
74. Kaplan, Segregation IAtigation and the Schools-Part II: The Gen-
eral Northern Problem, 58 Nw. L. REv. 157, 172 (1963): "The Supreme Court
has never held that in the absence of some racial classification the mere
Inequality of one school compared with another involves a constitutional
violation."
75. Freedom of choice, in the opinion of Judges Gewin and Bell, "if
exercised by students or by their parents or by both, depending on the
circumstances, in accordance with a plan fairly and justly administered
for the purpose of eliminating segregation, the dual school system as such
will ultimately disappear." United States v. Jefferson County Board of Edu-
cation, 380 F.2d 385, 404 (5th Cir. 1967).
76. In Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), the United States
Supreme Court held with respect to the congressional right to legislate
directly under the fourteenth amendment itself that, "correctly viewed
§ 5 is a positive grant of legislative power authorizing Congress to exercise
its discretion in determining whether and what legislation is needed to
secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 651. Congress
can act in a manner "necessary and proper" to effectuate the policies of
the Amendment; so there is a possibility that Congress could legislate
against the use of freedom of choice plans. However, in the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, Congress defines "desegregation" as meaning "the assignment
of students to public schools and within such schools without regard to race,
color, religion, or national origin, but 'desegregation' shall not mean the
assignment of students to public schools in order to overcome racial im-
balance." 78 Stat. 246 (1965), 42 U.S.C. § 2000(c) (1964).
77. For an opinion that invalidation of a free choice plan because It
does not result in a certain degree of racial mixing violates the Individual's
first amendment right of free association, see Judge Godbold's dissent in
United States v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 380 F.2d 385, 423-24
(5th Cir. 1967).
